



The President's Daily Brief

10 April 1971



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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On *Page 2*, we comment on the changes in the Soviet Politburo.


The situation in Pakistan is discussed on *Page 3*.

In Ceylon, security remains precarious and there has been scattered rebel activity in Colombo. (*Page 4*)

On *Page 5*, we discuss our current problems in attempting to monitor and analyze the flow of south-bound infiltration from North Vietnam.

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
USSR

The changes in the Politburo that Brezhnev announced at yesterday's closing session of the party congress add up to some substantial political gains for the general secretary. At least three of the four officials added to the Politburo have been closely identified with Brezhnev in the past. Although all 11 previous incumbents on the Politburo were retained, several who have been in opposition to Brezhnev on occasion in the past have slipped in protocol rankings.

The new members are Kazakh Republic party boss Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Ukrainian Premier Vladimir Shcherbitsky, and first secretary of the Moscow city party organization Viktor Grishin--all three of whom were elevated from candidate members of the Politburo--and party secretary Fedor Kulakov. Kunayev has been one of Brezhnev's most unabashed public promoters. Shcherbitsky comes from Brezhnev's home territory of Dnepropetrovsk in the Ukraine and worked there directly under Brezhnev's ally Kirilenko for a number of years. Kulakov has worked closely with Brezhnev and Deputy Premier Polyansky in formulating policy for agriculture, which is to enjoy a higher priority under the new five-year plan. Grishin's ties to Brezhnev are the most nebulous, but he has warmly praised Brezhnev in public speeches and may also have ties to Kirilenko. All four of the new men appear to be competent but uninspiring party bureaucrats, and their addition does not seem to herald any change in Soviet policy.

Politburo members who suffered protocol snubs in yesterday's announcement include Premier Kosygin, Premier of the Russian Republic Voronov, and trade union head Shelepin; candidate member Mzhavanadze, who is party boss in Georgia, and party secretary Demichev also slipped in the protocol ranking. All of them have apparently been in opposition to Brezhnev at one time or another. On the other hand, the independent-minded veteran party secretary, Suslov, seems to have maintained his high standing.

While the composition of the party secretariat and other key ruling organs remains unchanged, Brezhnev now seems to have gained a working majority on the party's top body. By, in effect, packing the Politburo, he has diluted the influence of his old colleagues and he may even now have enough support to remove them at some future time should he find it expedient to do so.



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PAKISTAN

There are indications that government troops are beginning to move farther into the countryside. The Indian press claims that an army column is moving from Jessore against the provisional Bengali capital at Chuadanga. Another column may be advancing toward Khulna, while other troops, according to the press, have moved half way to Kushtia by water and are now trying to move overland toward the city.

In the north, [redacted] that army units from both Saidpur and Rangpur are attacking toward small towns but have made only limited advances.

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[redacted] the Bengalis are running low on ammunition in some areas. India presumably continues to supply small arms, and [redacted] a dozen or two Indian military advisers have been sent to East Pakistan.

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A senior East Pakistani civil servant has expressed his fear of possible famine to US officials in Dacca. He expects that current food stocks and grain yet to be harvested will be consumed in some areas by September, and he believes that the breakdown of the food distribution system will lead to severe conditions.

A number of factors, such as disruption of the distribution of seed, fertilizer, and pesticides, and of normal sowing and cropping patterns will aggravate the yearly grain problem in East Pakistan; production normally runs about two million tons short of requirements.

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CEYLON

The main fighting continues to be in the Kegalla area in the center of the island, but there has been some scattered insurgent activity in Colombo and rumors are widespread that the capital's water supply may be poisoned. With the situation still precarious and the insurgents still in control in several areas, morale is sagging among many government security forces who have been on duty for long hours without adequate equipment for this type of insurgency. [REDACTED]

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Heretofore, the rebels have avoided the large cities and their recent actions in and around the capital have markedly increased public apprehension. Many people simply want the issue resolved, even if the rebels win. The government appears bewildered and various spokesmen have been casting about randomly for support, often making contradictory statements as to the nature of the insurgency. Although the regime is getting some encouragement from traditional supporters, no trade union unaffiliated with a government party has spoken up in favor of the prime minister.

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NORTH VIETNAM

For about three years between late 1967 and early 1971, US intelligence was able to monitor the flow of southbound North Vietnamese infiltrators with considerable accuracy. Analysis of infiltration gave us valuable insights not just into Hanoi's manpower commitments but also into its strategic intentions in the war. The accuracy of our analysis was based--and indeed dependent--on a heavy flow of intercepted messages from throughout the infiltration system, but particularly from its northern end.

As we reported in The President's Daily Brief of 17 and 24 February, we have not had access to infiltration messages from the upper end of the system since the first of the year, apparently because Hanoi instituted a series of communications changes that made infiltration reporting more secure. Intercepts are still available from farther down the trail, but only sporadically. For instance, new messages indicate that five, and possibly even twelve, infiltration groups--as many as 4,000-5,000 men--not only passed into Laos but even reached the COSVN area without being detected in intercepts. Even with this reduced information base we have been able to estimate with reasonable confidence that around 75,000-80,000 infiltrators have moved south since the dry season began last October. (About 15,000 other ground combat troops that moved in integral units to southern Laos and northern South Vietnam from North Vietnam in the same period are not included in this total.) This total may require moderate upward revision in the next month or so.

The firmness of the dry season estimate, however, is due principally to the fact that the bulk of the infiltrators this dry season entered the system in 1970, when we still had a good reading on the flow inside North Vietnam itself. In the future, until current US efforts to regain comprehensive access to infiltration message traffic are successful, infiltration data are likely to be a less comprehensive and reliable intelligence tool than they have been in the past.

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NOTE

JORDAN: Today the government is planning to surround areas in Amman where the fedayeen have been concentrated and to search for weapons. With the commandos continuing to pull out of the capital, the chances of a major showdown appear to have lessened, but there may be scattered incidents. The government intends to station security force units permanently in these areas to guard against resurgence of a fedayeen threat to the city's security.

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